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Abstract
In this paper, we address the problem of estimating transport surplus (a.k.a.
matching affinity) in high dimensional optimal transport problems. Classical optimal
transport theory specifies the matching affinity and determines the optimal joint
distribution. In contrast, we study the inverse problem of estimating matching affinity
based on the observation of the joint distribution, using an entropic regularization of
the problem. To accommodate high dimensionality of the data, we propose a novel
method that incorporates a nuclear norm regularization which effectively enforces a
rank constraint on the affinity matrix. The low-rank matrix estimated in this way
reveals the main factors which are relevant for matching.
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1 Introduction
Optimal transport theory has attracted a lot of interest across a number of scientific dis-
ciplines, from pure mathematics (Villani, 2003) to various applications including machine
learning (Benamou et al., 2015) mathematical statistics (del Barrio et al., 1999) and eco-
nomics (Galichon, 2016). The basic problem of optimal transport is how to form pairs
of agents drawn from two populations in order to maximize the total utility, also called
matching affinity. The resulting joint distribution of pairs is called an optimal matching,
also called optimal transport plan.
Most of the theory of optimal transport has focused on the direct problem, namely
solving for the optimal matching, taking the matching affinities as given. In contrast,
we consider in this paper the inverse optimal transport problem: given the observation of
an optimal matching, what is the affinity function for which this matching is optimal1?
This problem arises naturally in the study of two-sided matching markets, which appears
in various fields of the social sciences. In sociology and economics, one instance of these
markets is the “marriage market,” following Becker (1973)’s seminal analysis, where one
observes the characteristics of both partners in married couples (such as education, height,
personality traits, etc.), and one wants to infer (i) which characteristics attract or repel
each other the most, and (ii) what combinations of characteristics are the most relevant
for matching.
In models of matching markets, vectors of characteristics x ∈ Rd for one side of the
market and y ∈ Rd′ for the the other side are available, and the joint distribution pˆi (x, y)
across matched pairs is observed, and we are interested in estimating the matching affinity
function Φ (x, y). Broadly speaking, models of matching markets are divided into three
1In the theoretical computer science literature, this problem is known as an inverse assignment problem,
see Burkard et al. (2009), Section 6.7 and references therein.
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categories: scalar index models, discrete models, and multivariate models, which we will
now briefly survey.
Scalar index models. A number of papers use scalar index models: they assume that
agents match on a pair of scalar indices x˜ = u>x and y˜ = v>y, which are weighted sums
of partners’ characteristics. Following a suggestion by Becker (1973), a number of papers
have used canonical correlation or linear regression techniques in order to estimate the
weight vectors u and v; see for instance Suen and Lui (1999), Gautier et al. (2005), Lam
and Schoeni (1993, 1994), and Jepsen (2005), and a caution against the misuse of these
techniques in Dupuy and Galichon (2015). A more robust ways to estimate the weight
vectors has been suggested by Tervio¨ (2003) using rank correlation. See also Chiappori et
al. (2012).
Discrete models. Following a seminal paper by Choo and Siow (2006), a number of re-
cent papers (Fox, 2010; Chiappori et al., 2016; Galichon and Salanie´, 2015) have assumed
that agents match based on discrete characteristics, either categorical variables like ethnic-
ity, or binned, such as the income bracket. However, the binning of cardinal variables may
be problematic as the results may depend heavily on the arbitrary choice of the thresh-
olds. Therefore, these models suffer from limitations when dealing with non-categorical
variables.
Continuous models. More recently, a continuous model has been proposed by Dupuy
and Galichon (2014), where the matching affinity is bilinear with respect to the matched
pairs’ characteristics, i.e. is given by x>Ay, where A, called the affinity matrix is a d× d′
matrix is to be estimated. This model enables weighted interactions between any pair of
characteristics. Of course, when the rank of A is one, A = λuv>, and one recovers the scalar
index models discussed above. But as soon as the rank of A is greater than one, a pair of
scalar indices on each side of the market would not be sufficient to describe the matching
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affinity. Dupuy and Galichon (2014) propose a moment matching procedure to estimate
A, which can be computed via convex optimization. However, as soon as the number of
characteristics goes large, the number of parameters to be estimated grows quadratically,
potentially leading to an overfit.
In this paper, we propose a novel method for solving the inverse optimal transport
problem in a high-dimensional setting, where we estimate the affinity matrix A under a
rank constraint in order to capture the relevant dimensions of interaction on which matching
occurs. Two applications to the marriage market are proposed that each highlight different
features of the proposed method. The first application uses the same data as in Dupuy
and Galichon (2014) and illustrates how our method allows one to identify the impact of
narrowly defined personality traits without having to aggregate these into aggregate traits
prior to the estimation of the affinity matrix as in that paper. The second application
is performed on data compiled in Banerjee et al. (2013) about the role of castes in the
Indian marriage market and illustrates the usefulness of our method when one is dealing
with categorical or ordinal variables and one does not want to either ex ante aggregate
categories or assume some cardinal scale prior to estimating the affinity matrix.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the matching equilib-
rium model and introduces the concept of affinity matrix. Section 3 describes the maximum
likelihood estimation of the affinity matrix, including a low-rank regularized version. Sec-
tion 4 present applications to two marriage markets datasets. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 The model
We first briefly recall the optimal transport problem; see Villani (2003 and 2008) for more.
Given two probability distributions µ1 and µ2 over Rd×Rd′ , the optimal transport problem
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is defined as
max
pi∈Π(µ1,µ2)
Epi [Φ (X, Y )] (1)
where Φ (x, y) is the measure of affinity between two agents x ∈ Rd and y ∈ Rd′ on each side
of the market, and Π (µ1, µ2) is the set of distributions pi (x, y) with marginal distributions
µ1 and µ2. Problem (1) is the Monge-Kantorovich problem of optimal transport.
2.1 Optimal solution vs equilibrium
The optimization problem (1) yields a centralized solution where a central planner would
decide which pairs to form. However, most matching markets (including the marriage
market which we study in this paper) are decentralized markets, in which agents decide
based on their own interest, leading to an equilibrium. It follows from the work of Becker
(1973) and Shapley and Shubik (1971) that the centralized and the decentralized problems
are equivalent. We sketch the argument as follows.
In decentralized problems, an outcome is the specification of a matching pi ∈ Π (µ1, µ2),
and of individual payoffs u (x) and v (y), which are attained by agents of respective types
x and y. The outcome is called stable when
u (x) + v (y) ≥ Φ (x, y) ∀x, y. (2)
Stability is a required condition for equilibrium. Indeed, if (2) were not to hold, then
 = Φ (x, y) − u (x) − v (y) would be strictly positive, and thus by matching together, x
and y could attain u (x) + /2 and v (y) + /2, which is strictly more than their equilibrium
payoffs u (x) and v (y). At the same time if x and y are matched at equilibrium under pieq,
then feasibility imposes that u (x) + v (y) = Φ (x, y). Thus, taking expectations of both
sides with respect to pieq will get
Epieq [Φ (X, Y )] = Epieq [u (X) + v (Y )] = Eµ1 [u (X)] + Eµ2 [v (Y )] . (3)
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Hence, pieq ∈ Π (µ1, µ2) is defined as an equilibrium matching whenever there exists
functions u and vv such that both conditions (2) and (3) hold.
Let us now show that if pieq is an equilibrium, then it is a solution of (1). Consider piopt
a solution of problem (1). Taking expectations of both sides of (2) with respect to piopt gets
Epiopt [Φ (X, Y )] ≤ Epiopt [u (X) + v (Y )] = Eµ1 [u (X)] + Eµ2 [v (Y )]
where the latter equality comes from the fact that piopt ∈ Π (µ1, µ2). Hence, Epiopt [Φ (X, Y )] ≤
Epieq [Φ (X, Y )], but by definition of piopt, these two quantities coincide and pieq is optimal
for the centralized problem (1). Hence, the decentralized solution (equilibrium matching)
coincides with the centralized solution (optimal matching).
However, the analysis above assumes that the existence of a matching between two
partners is purely deterministic given partners’ observed characteristics, which is not real-
istic. In order to allow for some randomness arising from agent’s unobserved heterogeneity
in the matching process, we shall make use of a regularized version of the optimization
formulation (1) in order to perform the estimation of Φ.
2.2 Modeling heterogeneity
It is a well-known result in optimal transport theory (see Villani, 2008, Chapter 9) that,
under suitable assumptions on Φ, the optimal matching will be pure, in the sense that
any x is matched deterministically to a unique y = T (x) for some bijective map T ; in
other words, the conditional distribution pi (y|x) of y given x, is reduced to a single point
mass. Clearly, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, this is no longer the case. Our
approach to modeling uncertainty consists in adding an entropic regularization term in (1),
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leading to
max
pi∈Π(µ1,µ2)
Epi [Φ (X, Y )− σ lnpi (X, Y )] (4)
where σ > 0 is a temperature parameter, so that setting σ = 0 recovers program (1).
Recently a number of authors have studied such a regularized version of the Monge-
Kantorovich problem (see for instance Benamou et al., 2015; Galichon and Salanie´, 2015
and references therein). One notable feature of (4) is that the optimal matching pi (x, y)
has form
pi (x, y) = a (x) b (y) exp (Φ (x, y) /σ) ,
where a (x) and b (y) are set by imposing the constraint pi ∈ Π (µ1, µ2), that is
∫
a (x) b (y) exp (Φ (x, y) /σ) dy = µ1 (x)∫
a (x) b (y) exp (Φ (x, y) /σ) dx = µ2 (y)
.
As a result, a (x) and b (y) can be obtained by the iterated proportional fitting procedure
(IPFP), a.k.a. Sinkhorn’s algorithm, which is presented in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 IPFP
Input: b(y), µ1(x), µ2(y),Φ(x, y), σ
while not converged do
a (x)← µ1 (x) /
∫
b (y) exp (Φ (x, y) /σ) dy
b (y)← µ2 (y) /
∫
a (x) exp (Φ (x, y) /σ) dx
end while
Return: a(x), b(y)
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2.3 Parameterization of the affinity function
We assume the simple parameterization of Φ as a bilinear form associated to some affinity
matrix A, namely
ΦA (x, y) = x
>Ay. (5)
This functional form will capture the interaction effects between the various dimensions of
the characteristics. The sign of Aij indicates that there is attractive (if positive Aij > 0)
or repulsive (if Aij < 0) energy between dimension i of x and dimension j of y. On the
contrary, Aij = 0 means that there is no interaction between xi and yj.
By positive homogeneity, we can normalize the temperature parameter σ in front of the
entropic term to σ = 1. Indeed, the solution of the problem with affinity function Φ and
temperature σ coincides with the solution of the problem with affinity function Φ/σ and
temperature one. Hence, we define
W (A) = max
pi∈Π(µ1,µ2)
Epi [ΦA (X, Y )− lnpi (X, Y )] , (6)
As before, the optimal matching piA retains the form
piA (x, y) = a (x) b (y) exp (ΦA (x, y)) , (7)
where a (x) and b (y) are computed by the IPFP algorithm 1. It follows directly from
expression (7) that
∂2 lnpiA (x, y)
∂xi∂yj
= Aij
which provides a nice interpretation of A as the matrix of cross-derivatives of the log-
likelihood of a matched (x, y) pair. In the sequel, we shall focus on the estimation of the
affinity matrix A.
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3 Maximum likelihood estimation of the affinity matrix
We would like to estimate A based on an i.i.d. sample of matched pairs
(
x(k), y(k)
)
, k =
1, ..., N , where x(k) and y(k) are respectively d and d′-dimensional vectors of characteristics,
and the observed matching is defined as
pˆi (x, y) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
δ
(
x− x(k)) δ (y − y(k)) .
3.1 Unconstrained maximum likelihood
As implied by the next result, the likelihood function turns out to have a particularly
tractable form and is globally concave.
Proposition 1. (a) The log-likelihood l (A; pˆi) of observation pˆi at parameter value A is
given by
l (A; pˆi) = NEpˆi
[
log piA (X, Y )
]
= N {Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )]−W (A)} . (8)
(b) It is a concave function of A, and its gradient is given by
∇l (A; pˆi) = N {Epˆi [XiYj]− EpiA [XiYj]} . (9)
Proof. (a) The log-likelihood of a pair
(
x(k), y(k)
)
is given by log piA
(
x(k), y(k)
)
. As the
pairs are independently sampled, the log-likelihood of the matching pˆi is given by l (A; pˆi) =∑N
k=1 log pi
A
(
x(k), y(k)
)
= NEpˆi
[
log piA (X, Y )
]
. It follows from (7) that Epˆi
[
log piA (X, Y )
]
=
Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )] + Epˆi [log a (X) + log b (Y )], but as piA and pˆi both belong to Π (µ1, µ2), it
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follows that
Epˆi
[
log piA (X, Y )
]
= Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )]− EpiA [ΦA (X, Y )] + EpiA [ΦA (X, Y )] + EpiA [log a (X) + log b (Y )]
= Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )]− EpiA [ΦA (X, Y )] + EpiA
[
log piA (X, Y )
]
= Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )]−W (A) ,
hence l (A; pˆi) = N {Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )]−W (A)}.
(b) Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )] is linear in A, and W (A) is convex in A, so l (A; pˆi) is concave. By
the envelope theorem, ∇l (A; pˆi) = N {Epˆi [XiYj]− EpiA [XiYj]}.
Thus, conditions (9) imply that the maximum likelihood estimator Aˆ should solve
EpiA [XiYj] = Epˆi [XiYj] (10)
for every pair i ∈ {1, · · · , d} and j ∈ {1, · · · , d′}, which thus turns out to be equivalent to
the moment matching procedure of Dupuy and Galichon (2014). Hence, assuming w.l.o.g.
that X and Y are centered at 0, this implies that Aˆ is the value of the parameter such that
the predicted covariance matrix covpiA (X, Y ) will match the observed one covpˆi (X, Y ).
One important advantage of the concavity of the log-likelihood function l (A; pˆi) is that
various additional regularizations can be incorporated into the estimation procedure. One
could constrain A to be entry-wise nonnegative so that only attractive interactions are
considered. One could also assume A is sparse, so that only a small number of pairs of
characteristics interact. In this paper, we are concerned with the case when only a small
number of dimensions, which are linear combinations of the characteristics, interact. One
shall then need to impose a requirement that the rank of A is small. The next sections
propose an effective method for doing so which is implemented on two marriage market
datasets.
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3.2 Low-rank regularization
In some situations, two scalar dimensions x˜ and y˜, obtained linearly from x and y via
x˜ = u>x and y˜ = v>y, suffice to explain the solution pˆi, where u and v are two unit vectors
of weights. In this case, A is simply a scalar multiple of rank one matrix uv>. More
generally, when the rank of A is equal to r, the singular value decomposition (SVD) of A
yields
A = USV >, (11)
where S is a diagonal r × r matrix with strictly positive diagonal entries (called singular
values) in the decreasing order, and U and V are two semi-orthogonal d × r matrices.
In this case, the total interaction term is x>Ay = x˜>Sy˜, where x˜ = U>x and y˜ = V >y
are the relevant dimensions of interaction. Note that x>Ay requires to sum over d × d′
interaction terms whereas x˜>Sy˜ only requires to sum over r ≤ min {d, d′} interaction
terms. Moreover, each singular value can be interpreted as the weight of the interaction
between the corresponding relevant dimensions of x˜ and y˜ in the total interaction term.
One can incorporate the rank constraint into the maximization of the likelihood, whose
expression is given in proposition 1, yielding
max
A
l (A; pˆi)
s.t. rk (A) ≤ r.
However, the general rank-constrained problem is non-convex and NP-hard, see Fazel
(2002). A natural convex relaxation of the problem is done by replacing the rank of A
by its nuclear norm (see e.g. Fazel, 2002; Recht et al., 2010), ‖A‖∗, defined as the sum of
the singular values of A. This yields a modified formulation of the problem as
min
A
{W (A)− Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )] + λ ‖A‖∗} (12)
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where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the nuclear norm constraint. Measuring the
complexity of the model by the rank of the affinity matrix, equation (12) indicates that
for λ = 0, one accepts the full complexity of the model and perform exact likelihood
maximization whereas, for large values of λ, one simplifies the model and deviates from
exact likelihood maximization. Hence, the parameter λ can be thought of as a parameter
controlling the trade-off between exact likelihood maximization and the complexity of the
model.
The computation for problems involving the nuclear norm can be efficiently carried out
using the proximal gradient descent method with guaranteed convergence (see e.g. Toh and
Yun, 2010). As noted in the previous section, l (A; pˆi) is continuously differentiable with
respect to A, and its gradient is given in expression (9). We now describe our complete
procedure in algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Proximal gradient descent algorithm for problem (12)
Input: A, step size t, matched pairs
(
x(k), y(k)
)
, k = 1, ..., N
while not converged do
Using the IPFP algorithm 1 to compute the optimal matching piA
A← A− t
(∑N
i,j=1(pi
A
ij − pˆiij)x(i)(y(j))>
)
[U, diag(s1, · · · , sd), V ] = SVD(A)
A← Udiag((s1 − tλ)+, · · · , (sd − tλ)+)V >
end while
Return: A
Additionally, we note that the nuclear norm regularization prevents overfitting the
covariance mismatch ‖EpiA
[
XY >
] − Epˆi [XY >] ‖F , where ‖ · ‖F is the Frobenius norm of
a matrix and which one recalls from expression (10) will be exactly equal to 0 without the
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nuclear norm regularization. Indeed, given U and V defined in expression (11), the first
order optimality conditions (Watson, 1992) are
EpiA
[
XY >
]− Epˆi [XY >]+ λUV > +N = 0, (13)
where N satisfies U>N = 0, NV = 0, and ‖N‖2 ≤ λ, with ‖N‖2 being the spectral norm of
N . Equation (13) indicates that EpiA
[
XY >
]−Epˆi [XY >] and A have simultaneous SVDs.
Moreover, the singular values of EpiA
[
XY >
] − Epˆi [XY >] corresponding to the strictly
positive singular values of A will be exactly equal to λ, while the ones corresponding to the
zero singular values of A will be less than or equal to λ. Thus, by varying λ, the covariance
mismatch, which equals the l2-norm of the singular values of EpiA
[
XY >
]−Epˆi [XY >], will
change as well.
We select the best λ by repeating a five-fold cross-validation (CV) twice, resulting in
ten different experiments. In each of the CV procedure, the whole dataset is randomly split
into five parts with equal size. For each λ, we estimate A via (12) using 4 parts and record
both W (A)−Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )] and ‖EpiA
[
XY >
]−Epˆi [XY >] ‖F evaluated on the remaining
part. From this we obtain an estimated prediction error curve as a function of λ, and we
select the λ value that minimizes both errors.
4 Application to marriage market data
We apply the low-rank optimal transport method to the case of bipartite matching in
the marriage market. We choose two applications, each corresponding to a data set with
features allowing us to test different aspects of our method. The first application revisits
the data set used in Dupuy and Galichon (2014). This data confronts the analyst with the
problem of selecting from a large set of observed characteristics of spouses, those that are
important for matching affinities. The second application uses data compiled in Banerjee
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et al. (2013) for which the analyst has access to categorical variables describing spouses’
observable characteristics. To take into account the effect of each categorical variable on
matching affinities, the analyst needs to create as many dummy variables as categories
distinguished, hence increasing rapidly the dimensionality of the affinity matrix.
In both these applications, the analyst faces the difficult task of estimating an affinity
matrix whose size is large, being the product of the number of observed characteristics
of spouses, relative to the number of observations. The high ratio of parameters to ob-
servations creates overfitting concerns. A solution would be to construct combinations of
the observed characteristics prior to the estimation, hence reducing the number of param-
eters of the associated affinity matrix. However, the construction of these combinations
of characteristics requires the analyst to define weights based on prior information about
matching affinity. In contrast, our low-rank optimal transport method allows the analyst
to simultaneously estimate the affinity matrix while selecting the relevant combinations of
characteristics using weights derived from the information contained in the affinity matrix
itself.
4.1 Personality traits
Our first application uses the Dutch Household Survey (DHS) ran by the Dutch National
Bank. In particular, a representative sample of 1,155 young couples observed in the period
1993-2002 in the Netherlands was constructed following the procedure outlined in Dupuy
and Galichon (2014). In this sample, the analyst has access to detailed information about
spouses’ characteristics such as education, height, Body Mass Index (BMI)2 and subjective
health, but also about personality traits and attitude towards risk. Personality traits
are herewith recovered by administrating the 16 Personality Factors test (16PF test) to
2Weight in Kg divided by the square of height in meters.
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respondents (see e.g. Cattell et al., 1993). This test consists in a 16-item questionnaire
where each item corresponds to a primary factor describing a facet of one’s personality.
Attitude towards risk is recovered using a similar approach (see e.g. Donkers and Van Soest,
1999). A 6-item questionnaire about risk attitude is administrated to the respondents, each
item corresponding to a primary factor describing a facet of one’s attitude towards risks.
In this application, the objective is to estimate matching affinities from the sample
of 1,155 couples with characteristics (X, Y ), where X and Y contain each 26 variables:
education, height, BMI, subjective health and the 16 primary factors of personality traits
and 6 primary factors of risk attitude. The associated affinity matrix has 26 × 26 = 676
parameters to be estimated, hence a ratio of 0.58 parameters per observation. Dupuy and
Galichon (2014) substantially reduced the dimensionality of the model by constructing 5
global factors of personality traits and 1 global factor of attitude towards risk. They relied
on the psychology literature that shows that 5 global factors, often referred to as the “big
5,” providing an overview of one’s personality can be derived from the primary factors of
the 16PF using methods such as Factor Analysis. These 5 global factors are (orthogonal)
linear combinations of the 16 primary factors. Similarly, as is standard in the economic
literature (see e.g. Donkers and Van Soest, 1999), a single global factor providing an
overview of attitude towards risk can be derived as a linear combination of the underlying
6 primary factors. As a result, Dupuy and Galichon (2014) were able to estimate a reduced
affinity matrix of dimension 10×10 = 100, with a ratio of 0.09 parameters per observation.
However, this requires to assume that i) either all or none of the primary factors belonging
to a global factor matter and ii) their relative importance is proportional to their relative
weight in the global factor. There are no reasons to expect this should hold universally since
the weights used to create the global factors are chosen so as to provide an overview of an
individual’s personality or attitude towards risk and not to capture matching affinities. In
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contrast, our low-rank optimal transport approach, allows us to estimate the affinity matrix
of size 676 associated with the primary factors while creating the relevant combinations of
these factors that matter for matching affinities.
We use the low-rank optimal transport approach to estimate the affinity matrix A when
considering characteristics including the primary factors. Inspection of Figure 1 indicates
that λ = 0.15 gives slightly lower values of the CV errors of both W (A) − Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )]
and ‖EpiA
[
XY >
]−Epˆi [XY >] ‖F than λ = 0.1 does. Since λ = 0.15 achieves this result with
a lower rank of A, we use this value as the coefficient for the nuclear norm regularization.
The left panel of Figure 2 reveals the rank of the affinity matrix is 12 hence indicating that
only 12 relevant dimensions matter for matching affinities. Of those 12 relevant dimensions,
the first three alone explain about 50% of the total matching affinity as indicated in the
right panel of Figure 2.
The loadings of the first three dimensions, reported in Table 1, reveal several impor-
tant results. First, as in Dupuy and Galichon (2014), we do find that the first relevant
dimension loads principally on education, i.e. 0.85 for men and 0.83 for women respec-
tively, whereas the second and third dimensions load principally on personality traits and
attitude towards risk. However, using the primary factors rather than the global factors as
in Dupuy and Galichon (2014), we find that although conscientiousness matters for both
men and women, the underlying primary factors at play differ across gender. For women,
the primary factor “easily hurt, offended,” belonging to the global factor conscientiousness,
is the most important characteristic in the second dimension with a loading of 0.71. For
men, the primary factor “easily hurt, offended” plays also an important role (loading of
magnitude 0.42), but the primary factor “disciplined,” also belonging to the global factor
conscientiousness, is the most important one with a loading of 0.52. These results clearly
illustrates that although conscientiousness matters, not all of its primary constituents do
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and different aspects matter differently for men and women.
A similar type of results holds for the third dimension, which loads on some but not
all of the items measuring attitude towards risk. However, this dimension also loads on
other variables such as height, BMI and subjective health, making its interpretation more
difficult.
4.2 Castes in India
The second application of our method is on data compiled by Banerjee et al. (2013). These
data were collected based on interviews of Hindus families that placed a matrimonial ad
in the major Bengali newspaper in India, between October 2002 and March 20033. A
year after, 289 brides and grooms that had gotten married or engaged were interviewed a
second time, resulting in, as labeled in Banerjee et al. (2013), the “matches” data. We
use the sample of 284 couples for which information about the caste of both spouses is
available. Based on this information, we create 8 dummy variables, one for each of the 8
main Hindus castes in India. In addition, the data contains information about the height,
education, family origin (from west Bengal or not), the number of older (younger) brothers,
the number of older (younger) sisters, income and per capita consumption of each spouse.
To avoid deleting too many observations because of missing information on height and
per capita consumption we proceeded as follows. For each of these variables, we replaced
missing values by the sample mean and created a dummy variable indicating missing. Both,
the imputed variable and the missing indicator were included into the set of characteristics
considered in the analysis. Our working data set contains a sample of 284 couples with 19
characteristics observed for each spouse.
3In India, marriages are often a family affair, with parents or relatives of prospective brides or grooms
placing a matrimonial ad in a newspaper.
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In this application, the analyst is therefore confronted with the problem of estimating
an affinity matrix A of size 19× 19 = 361 using a sample of 284 couples. The ratio of 1.27
parameters per observation prevents the use of standard techniques unless one constructs
combinations of the characteristics of spouses to reduce the size of the affinity matrix. A
possibility to reduce the dimensionality of the model would be to group castes into larger
classes. Since castes are organized hierarchically, the analyst could for instance define
a threshold, grouping castes ranked below the threshold into one class and the others
into a second class. The associated affinity matrix would have size 12 × 12, resulting in
144 parameters to be estimated with 284 couples, that is a ratio of roughly 1 parameter
for 2 observations. However, this aggregation of castes into larger classes would impose
restrictions on the role of castes in matching affinity. The chosen aggregation implies
indeed that a man of say caste 1 has the same affinity for a woman of any caste within
the same class. Given the rarity of inter-caste marriages and the evidence of same-caste
preferences documented in Banerjee et al. (2013), this assumption does not seem to be
justified. As an alternative, the low-rank optimal transport method introduced in this
paper allows one to perform the estimation of the affinity matrix while selecting only the
relevant combinations of characteristics that matter for the matching affinities.
Figure 3 indicates that λ = 0.2 gives slightly lower values of the CV errors of both
W (A) − Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )] and ‖EpiA
[
XY >
] − Epˆi [XY >] ‖F than λ = 0.1 or λ = 0.3. We
therefore select λ = 0.2 for the analysis. The resulting affinity matrix has rank 10 as
indicated in Figure 4 such that out of 19 possible dimensions of interaction only 10 are
relevant. The first three dimensions together account for about 50% of the total matching
affinity as shown in Figure 4.
Inspection of the loadings of the first three dimensions, reported in Table 2, clearly
reveals the importance of castes in matching affinities. The first 3 dimensions on both
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sides have indeed large loadings on castes dummies. In the first dimension for instance,
the dummy variable for being of the “Brahmin” caste has by far the largest loading, i.e.
approximately 0.80, for both men and women. There is therefore a considerable loss in
matching affinity for someone of the “Brahmin” caste to marry outside of his/her caste.
Although less pronounced, we also find evidence for same-caste affinity for the “Kayastha,”
“Baisya,” and “Sagdope” castes4, as indicated by the relatively large loadings with same
sign for men and women on the second dimension (for all three castes) and on the third (for
the latter). These results tend to corroborate Banerjee et al. (2013)’s finding of same-caste
marriage preferences. However, our results also reveal two important new findings. First,
the “Baisya” and “Sagdope” castes both have positive loadings on the second dimension,
which suggests a significant inter-caste matching affinity between spouses of these two
castes. Second, in contrast, the “Kayastha” caste has a negative loading on the second
dimension for both men and women. This indicates a negative (repulsive) matching affinity
between men and women of the “Baisya” and “Sagdope” on the one hand and men and
women of the “Kayastha” on the other hand.
Interestingly, education does not seem to play as an important role as in the previous
application. However, as noted in Banerjee et al. (2013), this is probably due to the fact
that the sample is representative, not of the whole population but rather of the Bengali
middle-class that exhibits little variation in educational achievement: 85 percent of men
and women in the sample have indeed at least a bachelor’s degree.
5 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of rank-constrained estimation tech-
4The other four main castes only represent a very small fraction of the sample, less than 10% together,
which probably partly explains why we do not find significant results for these castes.
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niques when solving inverse optimal transport problems. Inverse optimal transport prob-
lems are often faced with large dimensionality of the data sets; hence it is crucial to develop
dimensionality reduction techniques. We plan to investigate further applications of this
methodology, including explaining the intensity of mercantile exchanges between countries
by the similarities in their characteristics, predicting stable matches in online dating plat-
forms, or understanding the determinants of workers’ productivity on the labor market. We
also plan to consider an extension of the present methodology to nonbipartite networks,
which will allow to estimate the transport costs in minimum cost flow problems, with ap-
plications to analyzing urban transportation demand, as well as link formation in social
networks.
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Figure 1: Cross-validation errors of (left) the negative log-likelihoodW (A)−Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )]
(right) the covariance mismatch ‖EpiA
[
XY >
]− Epˆi [XY >] ‖F .
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Figure 2: (Left) singular values (right) cumulative shares.
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Singular value
Singular vector
Oriented toward people
Quick thinker
Not easily worried
Stubborn, persistent
Vivid, vivacious
Meticulous
Dominant
Easily hurt, offended
Suspicious
Dreamer
Diplomatic, tactful
Doubts about myself
Open to changes
Independent, self-reliant
Disciplined
Irritable, quick tempered
Ready to take risk for high possible returns
Investments in shares are too risky
Ready to borrow money for risky investment
Want to be certain my investments are safe
Should take greater financial risks
Ready to risk losing money to gain money
Educational level
Height
BMI
Subjective health
s1 = 0.39
U1 V1
-0.07 -0.04
0.08 -0.01
-0.10 0.00
0.06 0.03
0.00 0.02
-0.12 -0.05
0.05 0.06
-0.06 -0.03
0.08 0.01
-0.04 0.02
-0.06 0.07
0.06 0.13
0.10 0.03
-0.10 -0.11
0.01 0.01
0.00 -0.16
0.17 0.24
-0.31 -0.29
0.12 0.13
0.01 0.05
-0.06 -0.07
0.10 0.09
0.85 0.83
0.06 0.08
-0.20 -0.24
-0.01 0.01
s2 = 0.32
U2 V2
-0.08 0.19
0.25 -0.12
0.29 0.11
0.11 0.14
0.04 0.19
-0.01 0.04
-0.09 -0.21
0.42 0.71
0.16 0.14
-0.08 0.23
0.07 -0.10
-0.31 -0.35
0.12 0.04
0.31 0.04
0.52 0.17
0.08 -0.17
-0.02 -0.07
0.05 -0.07
-0.16 -0.03
-0.12 0.02
-0.03 -0.05
0.06 -0.02
0.12 0.12
0.12 0.01
0.17 0.18
-0.15 -0.06
s3 = 0.24
U3 V3
0.04 -0.08
-0.04 0.05
0.08 -0.07
-0.11 0.02
-0.23 0.11
0.16 0.17
0.00 0.08
0.02 -0.02
0.11 0.04
0.00 0.04
0.00 -0.03
0.17 0.09
-0.22 0.05
0.01 -0.09
0.01 -0.11
-0.02 -0.03
0.27 0.29
0.48 0.53
-0.17 -0.08
0.42 0.24
-0.11 -0.18
-0.38 -0.48
0.27 0.21
-0.12 -0.25
0.16 0.29
-0.21 -0.17
Table 1: Loadings of the top three relevant dimensions of matching affinities, Dutch couples.
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Figure 3: Cross-validation errors of (left) the negative log-likelihoodW (A)−Epˆi [ΦA (X, Y )]
(right) the covariance mismatch ‖EpiA
[
XY >
]− Epˆi [XY >] ‖F .
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Figure 4: (Left) singular values (right) cumulative shares.
28
Singular value
Singular vector
Height
Height missing
Educational level
Family from west Bengal
Number of older brothers
Number of younger brothers
Number of older sisters
Number of younger sisters
Income
Per capita consumption
Per capita consumption missing
Castes: 1 Brahmin
2 Baidya
3 Kshatriya
4 Kayastha
5 Baisya
6 Sagdope
7 Others
8 Scheduled castes
s1 = 0.53
U1 V1
-0.22 -0.13
-0.02 0.27
0.09 0.01
0.12 0.13
0.08 -0.05
0.03 -0.03
-0.09 -0.08
-0.07 0.04
-0.11 0.06
0.02 -0.01
0.06 -0.04
0.80 0.79
-0.10 -0.03
-0.03 0.05
-0.30 -0.38
-0.34 -0.22
-0.06 -0.09
-0.13 -0.10
-0.10 -0.20
s2 = 0.43
U2 V2
-0.05 0.13
-0.01 0.12
0.26 0.30
0.16 0.32
-0.06 -0.17
-0.01 -0.16
-0.06 0.13
-0.19 -0.09
0.24 -0.02
0.06 0.13
-0.06 0.22
-0.07 -0.15
-0.13 0.01
-0.05 0.10
-0.50 -0.41
0.40 0.39
0.57 0.48
-0.19 -0.23
0.06 -0.06
s3 = 0.38
U3 V3
-0.21 -0.20
0.07 0.00
-0.27 -0.08
-0.37 -0.42
0.08 -0.08
0.03 0.18
0.05 0.10
0.17 -0.01
-0.21 -0.17
-0.25 -0.03
0.00 -0.10
0.12 0.09
-0.34 -0.37
-0.11 -0.05
-0.28 -0.34
0.51 0.57
-0.25 -0.20
0.15 0.11
0.21 0.22
Table 2: Loadings of the top three relevant dimensions of matching affinities, Indian couples.
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